There are a few reasons why waiting until late in the offseason to make moves can be seen as doing smart business.

Some big names may fall through the cracks and have to settle for less money after their other (often more spendy) suiters have already run through their budgets.

Suddenly, those big names have to decide whether they want to play for less money than expected or not play at all.

But even if the names aren’t big, the same idea applies.

Say 10 teams started the offseason looking for a back-end starter, and in February, eight of the fifteen free back-end starter agents had already signed.

Those last seven players are trying to get jobs with the last two teams. Those two teams now get to grab their favorite at the right price.

The same happens with trades. Your veteran might be worth a little more when the free-agent pool gets thin.

Conversely, a team desperate to shed salary might be more willing to give you their guy at a bargain. It’s all a push and pull, and being patient can open the door to deals that weren’t possible in December.

But there is a downside. If you’ve had the privilege of picking over the last seven back-end starters in free agency, you might need to ask yourself why these seven, specifically, fell to you.

Sure, you can pick the best of them, but even at a discount, are they actually a better deal than going out and getting your guy before Christmas?

Let’s review the 24 February and March acquisitions that Falvey and Co. have made since 2017.

2017: The Matt Belisle Year (slight success)
I almost left this year off because the pattern truly didn’t start until the following offseason. It was Falvey’s first season, and they signed Belisle as a setup-ish pitcher for $2.05 million. He had a solid year, so it was a success, but probably only in spirit.

2018: The Messy Year (failure with one bright spot)
This is the year that could have scared a lot of GMs off this strategy. The headliners everyone thinks of when 2018 comes up are Lance Lynn and Logan Morrison. Lynn signed a one-year, $12-million deal on Mar. 10. Morrison signed a one-year, $6.5-million contract two weeks earlier, on Feb. 25.

Lynn was one of the top pitchers on the market, but because of a historically bad year for free agents, he needed Minnesota’s paltry offer. Morrison was coming off a breakout 2017 campaign, but he still didn’t get the market he expected. Both players were described as disgruntled, and their on-field performance matched those rumors. Lynn had his worst year as a pro before being traded at midseason, and Morrison basically played his way out of baseball in 2018.

The strategy did work to some extent, as they signed starting pitcher Anibal Sánchez a week before Morrison on Feb. 17, and he had two very good years in 2018 and 2019—just not for the Twins. Compounding the error of signing Lynn, the Twins cut Sánchez a month after signing him to clear roster space for Lynn.

The true bright spot was their trade for Jake Odorizzi. The Twins had been going back and forth with the Rays, negotiating a deal to acquire a starting pitcher for much of the offseason. When the Twins truly had a need arise (an Ervin Santana injury), they pulled the trigger, sending Jermaine Palacios to Tampa Bay in what was largely a salary dump for their trading partners.

Odorizzi was a consistent force in the rotation through 2019, and the Feb. 18 trade is one of the crown jewels of Falvey’s tenure. Sometimes, being patient and getting the right deal for a guy you want does pay off. Beyond that, still having resources to add when needs arise late in the offseason (both prospect and monetary capital) is beneficial.

Also, they traded Luis Gil for Jake Cave on Mar. 16, another opportunistic failure—the Yankees needed to clear 40-man roster space and Cave was on the chopping block. We all know how this one turned out.

2019: The Marwin González Year (success)

González was still sitting around after spring training had started. On Feb. 22, he signed a two-year, $21-million deal. There were question marks around Miguel Sanó following a miserable year and an offseason injury that would keep him out of the lineup for the season’s first two months.

In reflecting on the disastrous 2018 season, Falvey and Levine had specifically mentioned feeling they were overbalanced with players on one-year deals, particularly because Lynn and Morrison came in somewhat unhappy. Between those two and Brian Dozier, the front office felt they had allowed a “mercenary” mentality to overtake the clubhouse. Many assumed that would be the end of the Twins backstopping the market for high-profile free agents, but instead, they plunged right back into the same waters one year later.

The difference was that they gave their quarry a multi-year deal this time. González made some money, likely less than he’d hoped, but filled a role. This one probably wasn’t as intentional as others on the list, because it was spurred by a late need arising, but they probably couldn’t have gotten González for that price any earlier than they did. It’s somewhat similar to the Odorizzi trade.

2020: The Maeda-Betts-Graterol Debacle (slight success)

A team preferring opportunism doesn’t preclude them from getting a little fixated on their guy. Initially, a deal that sent Mookie Betts and David Price to Los Angeles, Kenta Maeda to Minnesota, and Brusdar Graterol and Dodger prospects to Boston broke down over the Red Sox’s concerns about Graterol. The three teams then arranged their moves separately.

Instead of Boston, Graterol was sent to Los Angeles on Feb. 9, along with Luke Raley and a competitive balance pick, for Maeda, Jair Camargo and $10 million.

Maeda had a solid run in Minnesota, including a Cy Young runner-up abbreviated season in 2020, but he also lost significant time to injury. Graterol has been a very good reliever when healthy, but you generally take a good starter over a great reliever.

2021: The Freakin’ Offseason (failure with one bright spot)

Sometimes, even the most low-risk purchases can be devastating. On Feb. 3 and 15, the Twins signed Alex Colomé and Matt Shoemaker, respectively, for a combined $8.5 million. Similar to Lynn and Morrison, it’s not entirely unfounded to point at these two as a significant reason that the Twins had the season that they did. At times, picking over the leftovers only returns leftovers.

Nelson Cruz also came back for his third year in Minnesota, signing Feb. 3. He put together a good first half, well worth the $13 million investment, and he was the centerpiece in the trade that brought Joe Ryan to Minnesota at the trade deadline. In this case, gambling and waiting worked, as Cruz had limited suiters despite a terrific 2019 and 2020.

Also, they traded LaMonte Wade Jr. for Shaun Anderson on Feb. 5. This might have been a case of waiting too long to decide on a trade that the team knew it “needed” to make (after choosing Cave over Wade as their fourth outfielder). However, I’m not sure if it counts.

2022: The Lockout Year (definitely doesn’t count)

It’d be a little disingenuous to include these moves in their “wait it out” plans, because everyone was waiting it out.

The league had a months-long freeze on any transactions over a labor dispute, so every team made a flurry of moves in March.

In order, the Twins traded Mitch Garver for Isiah Kiner-Falefa and Ronny Henriquez; traded Chase Petty for Sonny Gray and Francis Peguero; traded Kiner-Falefa, Josh Donaldson, and Ben Rortvedt for Gary Sánchez and Gio Urshela; signed Carlos Correa; signed Joe Smith; and signed Chris Archer in a span of 16 days in March.

If we remove the seven trades and signings this year, the team has still averaged 2.4 February-or-later moves per offseason, or 2.7 if you also throw out 2017.

I will isolate one trade that shows just how long Falvey is willing to wait for a “good deal.” On Opening Day, Apr. 7, he completed a trade, sending Taylor Rogers, Brent Rooker, and $6 million to San Diego for Chris Paddack and Emilio Pagán.

By that point, Falvey had been shopping Rogers for something close to eight months, and he finally got a deal he saw as good on the first day of the season. We don’t need to get into all the details, but this one is mixed, to say the least, with ardent critics and defenders on both sides. I’m sure some will show up in these very comments.

2023: The Donnie Barrels Year (success)

Honestly, Donovan Solano is probably the best bang-for-your-buck player on this 31-player list. At just $2 million, the Feb. 22 signing was brought in as infield depth and a bench righty.

He ended up with the third-most plate appearances on the team, was one of the most consistent bats in the lineup for the full year, and really excelled as a pinch-hitter. If the Twins could hit on another one like this in 2025, it’d go a long way.

2024: Ballin’ on a Budget (failure, with one success)

Days after dumping Jorge Polanco’s contract to Seattle (which happened in late January, so it didn’t make the cut here), the Twins reallocated his money to Carlos Santana on Feb. 3 ($5.25 million) and Jay Jackson on Feb. 4 ($1.5 million).

Santana worked, effectively a step up from Solano with a slightly greater payday. Jackson didn’t.

But that’s what happens when you’re constrained to filling holes with the $6 million cleared from your starting second baseman’s trade.

They essentially did a salary swap with Miami, flipping Nick Gordon for Steven Okert, a trade that had no winners.

Then they spent the last $4 million earmarked for outfield help on a trade for Manuel Margot, prospect Rayne Doncon, and cash, sending Noah Miller to Los Angeles.

I sure hope Doncon pans out.

This is the new way of the MLB offseason.

he Twins aren’t alone in taking this approach; they just stretch the strategy toward an extreme other teams are more reluctant to reach.

The results are often decent; that’s why waiting things out has become such a popular paradigm.

The crime of which they’re guilty isn’t being dumb; it’s being uninspiring and underwhelming. Top free agents will always sign early, and blockbuster trades nearly always happen in November and December.

Confining themselves to February means voluntarily losing the winter in an effort to win the summer and fall. Again, all 30 teams are increasingly comfortable with that. The Falvey front office is just more patient (and more willing to underwhelm you, if it comes to that) than most.